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A transcendental argument is an argument of the form ‘Experience has feature F.
If experience has feature F, then the external world has feature G. So the external
world has feature G.’ Kant and others have attempted to use arguments of this
form to argue against sceptics about the existence of the external world.1 In this
chapter I’m not going to argue against any sceptics, but I’m going to show you
how certain very plausible assumptions about experience can lead to surprising
conclusions about how certain experiences are physically realized. In particular,
you’ll see how to travel transcendentally from facts about experience to facts
about the spatial properties of the brain.2
But to get that far will take us a while. To begin with, let me remind you of the
frequently discussed possibility of ‘spectrum inversion’.3 The familiar hypothesis
is that the qualitative character of your colour experience might differ system-
atically from mine. So, for example, when I see a red object, my colour
experience might be qualitatively like yours is when you see a green object, and
vice versa. Further, it is claimed, since there is a (non-trivial) isomorphism from
the colour-space on to itself that preserves all the basic qualitative similarities and
differences between colours, this could occur without resultant differences in our
(ordinary) behaviour. It is this supposed symmetry that is meant to allow for the
possibility of non-manifest spectrum inversion.
The starting point for my discussion is the idea of qualitative inversion with
respect to another perceived feature of the local environment—its left/right
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1 Or, our knowledge thereof. Transcendental arguments typically have conclusions like ‘there is
an external world’, or ‘I am not a brain in a vat’, rather than, e.g., ‘I know that there is an external
world’.
2 Martin Davies (1992) has attempted to run a similar kind of argument, in his case from
armchair considerations to the conclusion that there is a Language of Thought.
3 For a classic discussion, see Shoemaker (1982).
orientation about the viewer.4 The idea is that there could be intra- or inter-
subjective inversion with respect to the ‘reflective orientation of the world’,
so that the way things appear to you when actually on the right is the way
they appear to me when actually on the left, and vice versa.5 It should be less
controversial that there is a symmetrical structure to the qualitative space of
left–right experience. This symmetry can be exploited to generate a different
kind of experiential inversion hypothesis.
So, for example, when you look in a mirror, the apparent reflective orientation
of the world gets inverted with respect to vision. Writing appears backwards, a
chair that is on the left-hand side of the room appears on the right-hand side, and
so on. Of course it’s normally quite easy to tell that you are looking in a mirror.
For example, one important cue is that items apparently in the mirror world
appear to change position systematically with a change in position of the subject,
in a way that would not occur if they were instead being viewed through a
transparent pane of glass.
But although such cues exist when this inverting effect is produced by mirrors,
perhaps experience could be left/right inverted in such a way that no such cues
exist. (In order for this to occur without behaviourally manifest consequences, all
the senses would need to be suitably inverted, not just vision.6)
So, to be explicit, when I say things like ‘the possibility of reflective inversion’
in this chapter, I mean the following:
The Inversion Hypothesis: There could be a subject exactly like me in his classi-
ficatory and discriminatory dispositions, and in his ability to navigate the
world, but who is such that, when under normal conditions he is presented
with a particular external stimulus, he has experiences that are left/right
inverted with respect to those that I would have under normal conditions,
when presented with the same stimulus.
I will call the experiences of someone who is thus inverted with respect to me
‘(non-manifest) mirrored experiences’ and I will refer to such a person as being
‘(non-manifestly) mirror-inverted’. (I will omit the parentheticals unless context
requires their inclusion.)
The point of considering this hypothesis rather than the usual colour inversion
hypothesis is that we will be led to certain surprising results already alluded to,
results that do not have obvious analogues in the colour case. So what I am
4 After completing this paper, I discovered that Susan Hurley has a related discussion of left/
right inversion in her (1998)—see, in particular, ch. 8.
5 I should note the related idea of up/down inversion, although I think it’s much harder to make
sense of non-manifest up/down inversion than left/right inversion. Interestingly, on at least one way
of spelling out what up/down inversion would amount to, it is just the same thing as left/right
inversion.
6 Note that there also has to be an inversion of the causal relationships between (narrowly
construed) intentions to move and bodily action if the experientially inverted subject is to suc-
cessfully navigate the space around her.
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interested in is not just the truth of Inversion Hypothesis (although I will present
some arguments for it), but also certain other results about left/right experience
that will be uncovered as we proceed. Moreover, the case of left/right inversion
can be used to make most of the same points that the inverted spectrum example
is frequently used to make, but less controversially. It also has the interesting
feature that left and right are spatial relations and not sensory qualities—this
means that certain ways of characterizing the inversion phenomenon that appeal
to the specifically sensory nature of colours will not be available in this case.
But before entering the main discussion, I need to show that non-manifest
mirrored experiences are at least prima facie conceivable (they are definitely quite
hard to imagine).
THE CONCEIVABILITY OF MIRRORED EXPERIENCES
I have found that when some people consider the hypothesis of mirror inversion,
they doubt whether there could be a coherent train of mirrored experiences.
Perhaps the world could look inverted if I were just gazing in one direction, but
could inverted experiences be consistently produced if I started to move around?
Let me explain what these experiences would be like with the following example
(the example will also serve as a basis for later considerations).
Take the layout of objects, floors, ceilings and walls in my apartment. It is
obviously possible that an exact mirror image of my apartment could be con-
structed, and mirror-image versions of all the objects inside be put in appropriate
counterpart locations. Furthermore, it seems obvious that if you were to wander
into this mirror apartment, things would look very different from the way they
would look if you wandered into my actual apartment.
Note that this mirror apartment would look like a reflection of my apartment
viewed from any counterpart position within the apartment at any counterpart
angle. It is an elementary result of geometry that the mirror image of a figure that
results from reflecting it through any one chosen plane can be mapped on to the
mirror image that results from choosing any other plane as the reflecting plane,
just using rotation and linear movement operations. Thus whatever plane we
chose to reflect the apartment through, the mirror apartment we would construct
as a result would be intrinsically the same.
We can use this set-up to describe the experience of an individual who is
mirror inverted.7 The character of his experience as he walks through the door
into my actual apartment would be the same as the character of your experience as
you walk through the door into the mirror apartment. As he moves along any
7 Likewise, one might explain the colour inverted spectrum hypothesis by saying that your
experiences might be just like the ones that I would have if I were in an environment exactly like this
except that all the colours of the external objects had been systematically switched.
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path through my apartment, his experience is the same as yours would be if you
traced the mirror path around the mirror apartment. And, given the simple
geometrical point made in the previous paragraph, we can see that at every stage
in this path, his experience would be a ‘mirror’ of the experience you would be
having in your counterpart journey.
This description of an inverted subject’s experience is not restricted to vision.
For example, the qualitative character of the overall experience he would have if
he stood in the middle of the apartment and turned around clockwise in a
complete circle would match the one you would have if you stood in the middle
of the mirror apartment and turned anticlockwise in a complete circle. Here it’s
not just the visual experience that would feel the same, but also the proprio-
ceptive experience and action awareness associated with turning the body. Or, to
take another example, if someone were to throw a ball at him that hit his left
elbow, he would have an experience qualitatively the same as the one you would
have if a similarly thrown ball were to hit your right elbow. Likewise with
sounds, smells, tastes, etc. A triumphant peal of bells coming from the left would
sound to this subject the way it would to you coming from the right; a bitter
crystal dissolving on the left side of the tongue would feel like it would to you
dissolving on the right side, and so on.
I will now consider some interesting arguments designed to show how mir-
rored experiences might be physically realized. These will serve to show that, on
certain assumptions, the Inversion Hypothesis is true.
MIRROR MEN
Consider first the following puzzle. Take the brain of a subject who is in the
midst of a train of conscious experiences. Suppose we also had another subject’s
brain that was exactly like the brain of this subject, except that the matter was
arranged in a mirror image.8 The question is: could there be any difference
between the experiences being had by the two subjects? A closely related question
is the following: suppose it were possible to physically reflect your brain in the
middle of a course of experiences, but hold all the other physical facts about the
brain constant. Would there be any difference between the experiences that
ensue and the ones you would have had if your brain hadn’t been flipped? (We
should avoid being seduced here by a misguided picture of experience as
involving a super-rigid homunculus gazing at an intra-skullular cinema screen
that would be inverted by the flipping.)
The answers we can give to these questions are constrained by the view we take
of the metaphysics of left and right. Let me briefly sketch the main views.
8 There are certain difficulties that arise with this idea to do with the possibility of laws of nature
that are sensitive to the left/right distinction. They will be dealt with later.
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Consider a left glove. There are two basic views about what makes it left-
handed. According to one view, call it ‘absolutism’, what makes a glove left or
right is its possession of an intrinsic shape property of ‘right glovedness’ or ‘left
glovedness’. On this view there is an intrinsic difference between a left glove and
a right glove, and every glove has one of these two reflective properties.
The other view, call it ‘relationism’, is rather more subtle. On this view, there
is no intrinsic non-relational difference between a left glove and a right glove. All
there really is, is the relation of congruence—that is, the relation that two gloves
stand in when they are of the same glovedness. There are no intrinsic properties
such as ‘left glovedness’ and ‘right glovedness’, so a left glove and right glove are
intrinsically the same.
Of course, the absolutist and relationist both agree that the congruence
relation exists; what is affirmed by the absolutist and denied by the relationist is
that when two gloves stand in that relation their so doing is grounded by a
difference in intrinsic properties. According to absolutism every glove has an
intrinsic reflective property, either ‘left glovedness’ or ‘right glovedness’, and
relations of congruence are supervenient on the distribution of these intrinsic
properties. According to relationism there are only reflective relations between
gloves, which are not grounded on the objects having any intrinsic reflective
properties.
A closely related distinction is between those who think there are inter-world
facts about congruence, and those who do not. For example, Kant mentions a
world containing a single lonely hand.9 Is there any fact of the matter about
whether it is a left hand or a right hand? If you think that facts about inter-world
sameness and difference depend only on the distribution of properties and
relations within worlds, then you will think that there could only be such a fact
of the matter if absolutism were true. Similarly, a relationist is likely to hold that
there is no real difference between any two worlds that purportedly differ only in
that one is arranged as a mirror image of the other. Strictly speaking, there is no
contradiction in a relationist not saying this, but that would commit him to the
view that there are brute modal facts that do not supervene on the distribution of
non-modal facts.
Whether you are an absolutist or a relationist makes a difference to how you
answer my questions about the experiences of incongruently brained subjects.
For if you are a relationist, then you hold the position that two incongruous
counterpart brains are intrinsically identical. If you also suppose that the char-
acter of experience supervenes on the intrinsic character of the brain, then you
are forced into the position that the experiences being had by the owners of the
different brains are the same. If you are an absolutist, then you think there is an
intrinsic difference between the brains. So the same supervenience claim does not
commit you to saying that the experiences in the two subjects are the same. The
9 See Kant (1991) for his classic 1768 discussion of this point.
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answer you give to these questions then depends on whether you believe that
intrinsic reflective properties could be part of the minimal base of physical
properties that determine the experiences being had by the owner of the brain.
The same kinds of questions arise even if you considerably weaken the super-
venience claim, as some philosophers with externalist tastes are wont to do.
Suppose, for example, that you only claim that the qualitative character of
experience supervenes on the intrinsic character of the whole subject and his local
environment (so, in particular, this intrinsic character includes relations between
the subject and the objects that he is experiencing). You can then compare this
set-up with an incongruous counterpart of the set-up, involving the subject and
his environment laid out in a mirror image. Again, if you are a relationist, you
will be committed to the view that the experiences being had in the two places
are the same.
THE RELATIONIST ARGUMENT
Keeping these points in mind, I will now present a more complex argument that
bears more directly to the question of whether inter-subjective reflective inver-
sion of experiences is possible. I’ll call this the ‘Relationist Argument’. I’ll call it
that because it’s supposed to show that if relationism is true then the Inversion
Hypothesis is true. A bit later on we will consider what happens if we suppose
absolutism to be true.
So let us take relationism as a premise. The Relationist Argument again
considers the difference between the experiences of a subject and a mirror-image
copy of this subject, although this time it’s the whole physical subject we will be
considering, not just a brain. Another difference is that we will only assume that
the subjects are incongruous immediately prior to the stimulation that causes the
experiences that we will compare. To anticipate, the conclusion of the argument
is that a subject who was initially a physical reflection of you (your mirror twin)
would, when presented with the same stimulus as you, have an experience that
was inverted with respect to yours.
The gist of the Relationist Argument is as follows. If we were to reflectively
invert the whole world around you the subject, then it seems like that would
make a big difference to its appearance. For example, if you were about to read a
sign that said ‘MIT’, then if we reflected the whole world around you, the sign
would instead read ‘TIM’. But if we are relationists, then there is no real dif-
ference between reflecting the world around you, and reflecting you the subject,
holding the world constant. So we can conclude that if we made a mirror copy of
you, he or she would have experiences like those you would have if the world
around you were flipped over.
The Relationist Argument can be illustrated with a ‘toy model’ of how
experience might depend on the physical realm. Imagine a group of subjects
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whose heads are painted red on the left side and white on the right side. These
striped subjects are able to have experiences just like ours. But what happens
when such a subject experiences an environment is that an image of the scene in
front of them is literally imprinted on their forehead. So if a bed is on the sub-
ject’s left, and a kite on his right, then the bed will imprint on their red side, and
the kite on their white side. And the experiences the subject has of any scene obey
the following rule: which experiences the subject has supervenes on the layout
of the imprinted image with respect to the red and white portions of their head.
So suppose we have one of these red and white beasts, and let us christen him
‘Striped Lefty’. Compare the imprinted pattern that Striped Lefty would get of
this ‘bed and kite’ stimulus with the pattern that would result from him being
exposed to the incongruent counterpart of the stimulus. Had the environment
been arranged mirrorwise, Striped Lefty would have instead ended up with a kite
image imprinted on his red side and a bed image imprinted on his white side.
Note that due to the asymmetrical distribution of colour on Striped Lefty’s
head, this second pattern on his forehead is neither identical to, nor the
incongruous counterpart of, the pattern caused by the first stimulus; this time
the bed image is white and the kite image is red. Indeed, that is just what
we require if his experience of the mirrored stimulus is to be different from that
of the original stimulus and we are assuming relationism.
Now suppose we build a mirror-image counterpart of Striped Lefty, as he was
prior to being imprinted. Let us christen this new beast ‘Striped Righty’. Striped
Righty starts off life with the right side of his head red, and the left side of his
head white. If we expose him to the ‘bed on left, kite on right’ stimulus, then he
will end up with a bed image imprinted on his white side, and a kite image
imprinted on his red side. In other words, he will end up in a state that is
physically a mirror image of the state Striped Lefty was in when we exposed him
to the opposite ‘kite on left, bed on right’ stimulus. But if we are relationists, this
is exactly the same physical state. So it follows that Striped Righty’s experience of
the ‘bed on left, kite on right’ stimulus is the same as Striped Lefty’s experience
of the ‘kite on left, bed on right’ stimulus. And the same is true of any other
stimulus and its incongruent counterpart. In other words, Striped Righty is
experientially mirror inverted with respect to Striped Lefty.
Note that the physical state Striped Righty goes into when presented with any
stimulus is neither identical to, nor the incongruous counterpart of, the state
Striped Lefty goes into when presented with the same stimulus. So there is no
contradiction here in holding that relationism is true and that Striped Righty
and Striped Lefty would have mirror-inverted experiences of the same stimulus.
(We would be in trouble, however, if both sides of Striped Lefty’s head were the
same colour to begin with; more on that shortly.)
The argument seems to work just as well if we consider instead the actual
supervenience base for experience rather than the red/white image imprinting
model. So suppose this time that we have just a normal human being, who we’ll
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christen ‘Simple Lefty’ (or ‘Lefty’ for short). Suppose at t1, Lefty has his eyes
closed10 and is about to view my apartment, and that at t2 the apartment viewing
begins. Let ‘Simple Righty’ (‘Righty’ for short) be a mirror image copy of
Lefty at t1.
The following statement is surely true:
(A) Suppose at t2 Lefty is viewing my apartment as it actually is. Then it is
true that if the apartment had been laid out in a mirror image of the way
it is actually laid out, his experience of it would have been reflectively
inverted with respect to the experience he is actually having of it.
Now suppose that we are relationists about left and right. We might think that
the following two hypotheses are really the same, in so far as the physical layout
of the respective universes is concerned.11
(1) At t2, Lefty has just opened his eyes, and is standing gazing at the reflected
version of my apartment, with the whole physical universe around the
apartment also reflected.
(2) At t2, Righty has just opened his eyes, and is standing gazing at my
apartment, as it actually is, from the perspective equivalent to the one
Lefty is gazing from in scenario (1).
Add in the third scenario:
(3) At t2, Lefty has just opened his eyes, and is standing gazing at my
apartment, as it actually is, from the same perspective as in (2).
Add in a fairly weak supervenience claim:
(WS): The qualitative character of a subject’s experiences supervenes on the
layout of physical properties of the whole universe.
We can now argue that the Inversion Hypothesis is true. It follows from (A),
(WS) and the physical sameness of (1) and (2) that the experiences had in (2) and
(3) are mirror-inverted with respect to each other. But they are experiences of
exactly the same environment from the same perspective (and we can stipulate
that conditions are quite normal). So we seem to have established at least one
possible case of inter-subjective reflective inversion. Therefore, if relationism is
true, then the Inversion Hypothesis is true.
The argument gives a physical sufficient condition for a mirrorwise difference
in experiences—an individual who is initially a physical mirror duplicate of
another individual will have experiences that are left/right inverted with respect
to that individual. This is a strict sufficient condition. If we found individuals
whose brain structure appeared to be built roughly in a mirror image to that
10 Or, better, he is in a state of total sensory deprivation.
11 Here we can ignore the possibility of haecceitistic differences between objects.
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found in normal humans, that might be thought by a proponent of the Rela-
tionist Argument to be empirical evidence that they were experientially left/right
inverted. (And indeed I am told that this is the situation with certain left-handed
people.)
As I set it up, the Relationist Argument assumes relationism. In fact it is
obvious that we could weaken this assumption to: ‘if there are absolute reflective
facts, then they are irrelevant in the determination of experience’, and the argu-
ment would be equally good. So, if you’re an absolutist, you can still consistently
use the Relationist Argument, as long as you don’t think absolute reflective facts
are part of what determines experience.
INVERSION AND FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE
An objection to the Relationist Argument which I should mention straight away
is as follows: the complaint is that this could not be a genuine case of ‘inverted
qualia’, because at the time when they are having inverted experiences of the
same stimulus, Lefty and Righty are in physically quite different states (they are
no longer merely incongruent), and so might be functionally quite different. But
aren’t inverted qualia cases supposed to be examples of functionally identical
subjects who nevertheless have different qualia?12
The issues here are similar to those that arise in the case of colour, so I will be
brief. My reply to this point is that we must distinguish different levels at which
two subjects might be functionally alike. The conventional inverted spectrum
scenario is normally only presented with a commitment to the subjects being
functionally the same at the common-sense level of classification, discrimination,
navigation and so forth. Such functional sameness is compatible with the
12 Ned Block, David Chalmers, and an anonymous referee all stressed this point to me.
1
TIM MIT MIT
2 3
Fig. 1. Three hypotheses.
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subjects being functionally distinct at some deeper level on which the difference
in qualia depends. So, for example, Shoemaker advertises himself as a proponent
of the possibility of inverted qualia, even though he is a physicalist, and a
functionalist about all physical properties.
Now I would claim that if the Relationist Argument goes through, Lefty and
Righty are relevantly functionally alike, so should count as an example of inverted
qualia. Righty’s basic sensorimotor capacities are the same as Lefty’s; for example,
it is not the case that if Righty attempts to reach for an object on the left, he will
reach to the right—he will succeed in basic navigation just as well as Lefty.
Having said this, I should admit that there may be some functional differences at
a fairly common-sense level, like the ability to interact with familiar asymmet-
rical stimuli such as writing and remembered environments. These things would
indeed look strange at first to Righty. But it’s hard to believe that once Righty
learned to adapt to these phenomena, and so became functionally the same as
Lefty with respect to them, that would make him qualitatively left/right inverted
with respect to his former self. Such abilities are very plausibly irrelevant to the
orientation of our experiences—for example, people who have trouble remem-
bering how to unlock their front door, surely can have normal left/right
experiences. The case of memory of familiar environments is perhaps more
controversial, and you might be tempted to conclude that Righty’s inversion just
consists in his finding these places to be different from how he remembers them.
I think that would be a mistake too, although it would take us too far astray to
argue the case in detail here. (A few suggestions are provided in the footnote
below.)13 But my main interest is with certain consequences of the Relationist
Argument that follow whether or not this should be classified as a genuine case of
inverted qualia, as that is normally understood.
Below we will see what happens if you think that absolute reflective facts exist
and are relevant to what experiences we have. But first I want to point out one
interesting and paradoxical-seeming consequence of the Relationist Argument.
SYMMETRICAL OBSERVERS
The conclusion of the Relationist Argument was that if we were to construct a
molecule-for-molecule physical duplicate of Lefty at the time when his eyes are
13 The position would have to be that experiencing an environment as having one orientation
rather than another consists of an input representation being compared with memory (the con-
gruence relations being calculated, and so forth). Against this, it seems plausible that: (1) someone
would have different experiences of incongruent stimuli even without stored information about his
environment, for example, if he were a baby or an amnesiac; (2) the visual processing on which the
basic spatial content of experience depends does not involve a ‘top down’ memory component of
this kind, but is wholly ‘bottom up’; and (3) if left/right determinate experience requires memory in
this way, then your first experiences could not be left/right determinate—but then how could
memories formed from them serve as a basis for the left/right determinacy of later experiences?
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closed, but arrange the matter in an exact mirror image of the way it is organized
in his actual body, the resulting mirror twin would, on opening his eyes, have
experiences that were reflectively inverted with respect to Lefty’s. However, this
result raises the following puzzle: what if Lefty happened to be constructed
symmetrically?14 In particular, what if his brain, the organ responsible for his
experiences, was constructed symmetrically? On the face of it, there seems to be
no reason why such a design could not be totally adequate for this organism to
achieve everything we actually achieve. Let us suppose that we have such a
symmetrical beast, and let us christen him ‘Simple Simon’ (‘Simon’ for short).
The problem now raised is that if we were to produce a mirror twin of Simon,
he would be in all intrinsic respects physically the same as Simon. So, provided
we are assuming that some reasonable kind of mental/physical supervenience
thesis is true, we would expect Simon to have the same kinds of experiences in the
same situations as his mirror twin. (In particular, if we consider Simon and
mirror Simon gazing at a scene from the same perspective at t2, having had their
eyes shut at t1, then, since they are intrinsically the same at t1, they’ll still be
intrinsically the same at t2.) But if we were to assume that symmetrical Simon’s
experiences depend on the world in much the same way that ours do, then we are
also led by the Relationist Argument to conclude that they would be different
from his mirror twin’s. So the assumptions of the Relationist Argument seem to
lead to a contradiction.
To clarify, note that Simon is only assumed to be symmetrical immediately
prior to being imprinted with experiences. Of course, once the river of experi-
ences starts flowing we would probably expect asymmetries to appear in the
brain, perhaps depending on how the brain is constructed. For example, you
might expect an experience of an asymmetrical landscape to require an asym-
metrical pattern of electronic activity in the brain. The point is that if Simon is
initially symmetrical, then at the time of experience he will be an exact mirror
duplicate of the way he would have been had the environment been arranged
mirrorwise. The puzzle is that if we suppose that absolute reflective facts are
irrelevant to determining experiences, then Simon would have the same
experiences whether the environment was arranged one way or the other.
In terms of our ‘toy model’ for experience, the situation is like one where both
sides of our imaginary subject’s head are painted the same colour. If that were the
case, then his forehead would end up in the same state (up to incongruence)
whichever of two incongruent stimuli we showed him. So he would have qua-
litatively the same experiences of the two stimuli.
Clearly, the only thing that someone who wishes to endorse the Relationist
Argument can do to avoid contradiction is to bite the bullet and say that Simon
has the same experiences of incongruent environments. We could describe this
consequence as ‘geometrical symmetry entails experiential symmetry’. Someone
14 Again, there is a problem here with asymmetrical laws of nature, which I will discuss later.
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is experientially symmetrical15 if her (veridical) experiences of incongruous
environments are the same. Another way of putting this consequence is that
asymmetrical experiences are necessarily underwritten by an initial asymmetry in
the subject’s brain. And I think that if this were true, that would be quite
surprising.
Even if we can’t imagine from the inside being experientially symmetric, it
seems there is nothing obviously incoherent about the idea, even if it is quite
puzzling. For example, Rory Madden described to me how when he was a child
he was puzzled by the idea of colour blindness. If someone can’t tell the differ-
ence between green and red, but their colour discriminations are otherwise
normal, surely this means that their experiences of both red and green things
must either be both like a normal person’s red experiences, or both like a normal
person’s green experiences. And then of course the puzzle is: which is it? But,
as he concluded, evidently the answer to this puzzle is that they are neither—
the colour-blind person’s experiences are just less determinate than ours with
respect to colour. And similarly with symmetric experiences—even though we
can’t imagine seeing an environment without seeing it as oriented reflectively one
way or the other, it seems at least prima facie possible that someone else’s experi-
ences could just be less determinate than ours in this respect. (To approximate to
what their experiences would be like, try imagining having two visual fields, one
oriented one way, and one the other. Or, even better, try imagining having a
patchwork of infinitely many visual fields arranged so they alternate spatially in
orientation.16 (The key thing is to not make the mistake of thinking that symmet-
rical experiences would be like our experiences of symmetrical environments.))
So there is sufficient reason for not dismissing the idea of experiential
symmetry offhand. However you might wonder whether it’s really true that
symmetrical Simon would have these experiences. There are two kinds of
strategy for casting doubt on this. First, you might simply attack the specific
argument we have for this claim, for example, by supposing that absolute
reflective facts exist and are part of what determines our experiences. Second, you
might argue that the conclusion is false on independent grounds, hence casting
doubt on the original argument. I’ll first discuss a worry of the latter kind.
As I mentioned briefly above, it seems offhand that a brain whose initial
design (i.e., prior to experience) was symmetrical could potentially achieve
anything that our brains can achieve. There is no obvious reason for supposing
that this design would necessitate any limitation on the range of psychological
features that the brain could support. It therefore seems bizarre to suppose that
this brain could not produce left/right experiences anything like ours.
An important example of a psychological feature that Simon clearly could
have, the existence of which jars with the view that his experiences would be
15 This bit of terminology was suggested to me by Ned Block.
16 Thanks to John Hawthorne for suggesting the infinite version of the ‘multiple visual
fields’ idea.
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symmetrical, is the following: it seems like Simon could perfectly well inten-
tionally move towards an object on his right, and it be true that had the object
been on his left he would have moved instead to the left to reach the object. So
Simon’s perceptual system could be quite capable of sustaining the normal kinds
of dependence between a bodily action and the location of the target of that
action. But you might wonder whether that fact is consistent with the claim that
the experience of the object would be the same whether the object was on the left
or the right.17
You could respond to this as follows. First, it has to be admitted that there is after
all at least one important psychological limitation that is imposed by symmetry.
This is that an initially symmetrical person like Simon could not make any clas-
sificatory distinctions between things on the left and on the right.18 If you ask Simon
to say which side of his visual field an object is in, left or right, then he could not tell
you. Equally, if you presented him with a word containing only symmetrical letters
like ‘TIM’ he could not tell you whether it said ‘TIM’ or ‘MIT’. This is because we
would expect the only physical difference between Simon and his behaviour with
respect to incongruous stimuli to be itself just incongruence.19 But it seems like
such classificatory differences would require more than just incongruence. It seems
that in order to make such a classificatory distinction there would have to be a left–
right asymmetry in the brain that was exploited to distinguish the two stimuli, in a
way somewhat analogous to the way a lock picks out a key.
Does this show that Simon has symmetrical experiences? Probably not. On
the face of it, experiencing a difference between left and right, and being able to
classify that difference are two quite different things. For example, being able
to say whether an object is on the left or right is a skill that is surprisingly difficult
to acquire. But we would not take a lack of such classificatory skills in a child to
be evidence that her experiences were not left/right determinate. So, if there is
strong connection between the content of experience and the ability of the
subject or the brain to classify information, that is something that is unobvious
and must be argued for. (Perhaps one way of articulating the debate over
whether experience could have non-conceptual contents would be in terms of
this distinction between content and classification.)
Indeed, doubt about such a connection is cast by the point about Simon’s
actions. The fact that Simon would walk in the correct direction to reach an
object whether it is on the left or right suggests that there can be evidence that
supports the attribution of a left/right distinction to the subject’s experience that
does not involve him classifying that difference.
17 A closely related point is that there is a sense in which incongruous subjects are functionally
different—their dispositions to move either to the left or right, for example, are different, so the
‘output clauses’ given in the functional characterization of their mental states would be different.
This might be thought sufficient for a difference in their experiences. (Also, see discussion on
p. 309–11). 18 I am grateful to Ned Block for pointing this out to me.
19 Again, modulo the effects of asymmetrical laws of nature, which I will discuss on p. 311–12.
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The relationist might respond to that point by saying that the two situations
of the object being on the right or the left could only relevantly differ if there was
some asymmetry in the subject’s body prior to experience. For example, he will
say that the difference between a subject being embedded in an environment as
opposed to its incongruent counterpart, is not that the two environments are
intrinsically different, rather that they differ in their relations to the subject’s
body. But these relations only differ if the subject is left/right asymmetrical prior
to experience. Otherwise the two scenarios are really the same, and so there is no
difference in behaviour that needs explaining. (This response seems to me suf-
ficient to remove much of the force of this observation.)
A final point about Simon is that unlike a colour-blind subject, it is plausible
that he might be able respond differentially to successive presentations of con-
gruent or incongruent stimuli.20 For example, if you showed him ‘MIT’ followed
by ‘TIM’, he could tell that the second stimulus was different, and he would say
that his second experience was qualitatively different from his first. This is so,
even though on the relationist view, had he been shown the opposite sequence of
stimuli (‘TIM’ then ‘MIT’), he would have had qualitatively the same sequence
of experiences. Now it seems that we must say that the second experience is
asymmetrical, otherwise we risk scepticism about whether our experiences are
asymmetrical.21 But then it seems surprising to claim that the first experience was
not also asymmetrical. Indeed, the problems seem to start even earlier. To what
extent is it coherent to speak of the ‘first experience’? (How long did it last?) And,
even supposing that there is such a thing, how could it introduce the required
asymmetry into Simon’s brain? For, if we suppose (as I suggested in n. 13) that
the basic spatial content of experience depends only on ‘bottom up’ processing,
and not on memory, then one might expect the relevant part of the brain to
‘reset’ itself prior to each new train of experience. This view of the processing,
combined with relationism, would result in the view that each new train of
Simon’s experience would be symmetrical, even though Simon would be able to
discriminate between incongruent stimuli, and would think that his experiences
of them were different. In light of this, the relationist may be forced into the view
mentioned in n. 13, that the existence of the left/right content of experience
depends on memory.22 This seems to be a fairly forceful consideration against
the view.
I now move on to consideration of what happens if we reject the main premise
of the Relationist Argument, and suppose that absolutism is true.
20 Not every symmetrical being would necessarily have this capacity. But there seems to be
nothing about symmetry to prevent you from having such a capacity.
21 If Simon’s subsequent experiences were not asymmetrical, he would still think that they were.
But then how would we know that we were not in the same position as Simon?
22 If this is right, then perhaps the relationist should reject my claim that adjusting to asym-
metrical stimuli like writing and remembered environments would not invert Righty’s experiences.
This would weaken the sense in which Righty could be said to be non-manifestly inverted.
304 Geoffrey Lee
WHAT THE ABSOLUTIST MIGHT SAY
The main premise of the Relationist Argument is that the experiences had in
perfectly incongruent scenarios are qualitatively the same (at least with respect to
left/right orientation). For example, it was claimed that the experiences had by
Lefty in scenario (1), and the experiences being had by Righty in scenario (2),
would feel the same. Now, as I have already remarked, an absolutist about the
left/right orientation of space could accept this premise, and so could accept
the conclusions of the Relationist Argument, provided they don’t think that the
intrinsic difference that they believe exists between incongruent counterpart
scenarios is relevant to determining the reflective character of any experiences
being had in those scenarios. On the other hand, they could also reject the main
premise of the argument, by insisting that this intrinsic difference does make a
relevant experiential difference.
If there is an intrinsic physical difference between scenario (1) and scenario
(2), then global supervenience alone will not tell us anything about the rela-
tionship between the experiences in the two scenarios—supervenience is com-
patible with the experiences being completely different. However, it is reasonable
to assume that both subjects are correctly perceiving the spatial layout of the
objects in the same amount of detail (perhaps modulo the reflective orientation
of the objects in space—we can leave open the possibility that one of the subjects
is perceiving this incorrectly). Given this assumption, we can intelligibly com-
pare the reflective orientation of their experiences—either it is the same or it is
different. The main premise of the Relationist Argument is that it is the same,
because the experiential facts do not depend in any way on absolute spatial facts
(if there are any at all). The most plausible alternative23 to this relationist view
would be to hold that in general the orientation of experiences being had in
perfectly incongruent scenarios like (1) and (2) is different—that is, the experi-
ences are opposite in orientation.
I will call this view Absolutism with a capital ‘A’. (Note that to be consistent
with global supervenience, this view requires that absolute reflective facts exist
and that orientation of our experiences depends on them.)
We can illustrate the Absolutist view by considering again the case of
incongruent counterpart brains. Would the owners of these brains have
experiences that feel the same? Provided that the Absolutist thinks that the
qualitative character of experience supervenes narrowly on the intrinsic state of
the brain, the Absolutist’s view is that the experiences had by the owners of these
two brains are opposite in their reflective character, because the brains are
identical except for the intrinsic reflective difference between them.
23 Strictly speaking, you could also hold the view that in some pairs of cases like (1) and (2) the
orientation is the same, and in some pairs of cases it is different. Most of my discussion of
Absolutism will also apply to this view, which suffers further difficulties I will not discuss.
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But, even if he does not assume any narrow supervenience hypothesis, the
Absolutist can still say, for example, that the experiences being had by Lefty in
scenario (1) and Righty in scenario (2) are relevantly different because the two
scenarios are perfectly incongruent, both with respect to the intrinsic set-up
of the observers and their environments. And that is one way to block the
Relationist Argument.
It is interesting to note that it would follow from Absolutism that Righty and
Lefty would have the same experiences of actual stimuli, and so would not be
reflectively inverted with respect to each other after all. For example, according
to Absolutism, when Righty sees ‘MIT’ he is experientially inverted with respect
to Lefty seeing ‘TIM’; so if we show them both ‘TIM’, they will have the same
experience of it.
I will shortly assess the plausibility of holding this Absolutist position. But let
us first ask: where would an Absolutist stand on whether the Inversion Hypo-
thesis is true? The answer depends on what kind of supervenience thesis about
the qualitative character of experience he thinks is true. If he thinks that what it’s
like for the subject depends only on what’s going on in the subject’s brain (the
‘narrow supervenience’ view), then he should think that inversion is possible. If
he thinks that a more external dependence holds, then he might reasonably think
that inversion is not possible.
As I have just remarked, on the narrow supervenience view, the Absolutist is
committed to the view that the owners of incongruent conscious brains will be
having mirrorwise different experiences. And now it’s not that hard to see how
you could set things up so the states of two such brains would be caused by the
same external stimuli under normal circumstances, so that inversion is possible.
For example, we could take Righty, and literally cross over all the neural
wiring in his body leading from brain to sensory neurons at the surface. For
example, we would reroute the neural connection that goes from left thumb-tip
to brain so that it goes from right thumb-tip to brain, and so forth. We could
also similarly rewire all the motor neurons, so that he could move around suc-
cessfully. Once rewired this way and given a particular stimulus, what would
happen in his brain during experience would be physically a mirror image of
what would happen in Lefty’s brain given the same stimulus.24 So if it is true that
brainwise physical inversion (at the time of experience) entails experiential
inversion, as we are now assuming, then ‘doctored Righty’ is experientially
mirror inverted with respect to Lefty.
Suppose we thought instead that certain external facts are part of the minimal
base of facts on which the qualitative character of experience supervenes, so that
narrow supervenience is false. If the Inversion Hypothesis is true, then there could
be inverted experiences caused by the same stimulus under normal conditions.
But the stipulation of same stimulus and normal conditions might mean that the
24 Again, modulo asymmetrical physical laws, which I will discuss shortly.
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relevant external facts are the same, depending on which ones we are putting in
the supervenience base. So the Absolutist externalist could argue that two subjects
under these conditions must be having reflectively the same experiences. So the
externalist Absolutist could argue that inversion is impossible.
If we are absolutists (small ‘a’), then it is certainly plausible that such
externalism is the correct view about the left/right content of experience. For
example, you might think that if an experience of an object that presents it as
‘phenomenally left’ is also caused under normal circumstances by the object
being actually on the left, then the experience represents it as on the left. (For the
relationist, the story about content might be more complicated—unfortunately,
I can’t get into that here.) If something like that is right about the left/right
content of experience, then there is one interesting brand of Absolutist extern-
alism that can be viewed as saying that what it’s like to see something as on
the left is exhausted by the fact that it is being represented as on the left. That
may sound plausible until we consider the possibility of left/right inversion. If
inversion is possible, then content externalism could mean that inverted subjects’
experiences have the same spatial contents, even though they are phenomenally
different with respect to left/right presentation.
It’s worth noting how much this kind of Absolutist externalist view of the
qualitative character of spatial experience jars with the unreflective view most
people would take. It would imply that it is possible for two subjects to be in the
same brain state, and both be having veridical experiences, but nonetheless for
the qualitative character of their experiences be different. That would be the
situation, for example, if we compared Righty viewing one environment with
‘doctored Righty’ (as defined three paragraphs above) viewing the incongruous
counterpart of that environment. Since the environments are incongruous and
we can assume that both subjects are having veridical experiences with absolute
left/right content, their experiences must differ in content, and hence, according
to this view, also in qualitative character.25 But their brain states are identical.
I expect some people will take this view, but its metaphysical oddness should
be acknowledged. The question of what the qualitative character of experience
supervenes on is surely at least partly an empirical matter; but I take it that our
common-sense empirical view is that sameness of the most proximate stimulus
can be sufficient for sameness of qualitative character, so that the more distal
facts could not be part of the minimal supervenience base. It would be a
remarkable discovery if that turned out to be false.
The externalist view is sometimes motivated by the thought that experiences
are relational states of affairs, and not simply monadic properties of subjects,
where the relata are subjects and local states of affairs like a layout of words on a
page being read, or an apartment being viewed. Since the same relation cannot
25 I’m assuming here that this theorist is allowing that there can be a qualitative difference
between seeing something on the left and seeing it on the right. That might be left open by my
characterization of the view above.
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hold both in a case of veridical experience and a case of hallucination, these
experiences must be different, the thought continues, even if the intrinsic brain
states involved are the same. But to conclude from this that these experiences
would be qualitatively different seems to me to be a non-sequitur—there is
evidently no reason why experiences that involve relations to different states of
affairs should not feel the same to the subjects having them. Equally, you might
even think that being experientially related to the same state of affairs could feel
different to different subjects. So it is evidently quite consistent to hold a narrow
view of the supervenience of qualitative character along with a relational view of
experience in this sense.26
So much for Absolutism and the Inversion Hypothesis. We now need to ask:
could Absolutism really be true?
The idea that these absolute spatial properties could make any difference to
experience might plausibly be thought as absurd as the idea that if the whole
universe suddenly spun around 180 degrees in absolute space that could
determine some change in our experience. This intuition can be brought out
especially strongly if we consider the fact that reflection is not a mathematical
operation of a substantially different kind from rotation or linear translation. In
fact, it can be shown that reflection is just an instance of a linear translation and
rotation, albeit through a higher dimension.27 Hence it would not be inaccurate
to say that the difference between a subject gazing at my apartment and a mirror-
image copy of the subject gazing at the mirror apartment is merely a difference in
the orientation of the two environments (the subject included as part of the
environment). But how could a mere difference in the orientation of the subject
and his environment constitutively determine a difference in experience, even if
these orientations could be thought of in absolutist terms? Again, we would
strongly resist this idea if the orientation in question was, for example, just the
location and direction of the subject and his environment in 3D space.28
26 A different ‘relational’ position about experience (see, for example, Johnston 2004) is one that
insists that the qualitative character of the experience is exhausted by and uniquely correlated with
the structured array of properties and relations one is related to in having the experience (rather than
the more concrete particulars and states of affairs). But that is not necessarily incompatible with
narrow supervenience, especially if one thinks that you can be acquainted with such an array in
having an hallucination. Is this position correct? It would be close to being the right view if it could
be argued that whenever one’s experience has a certain sensory quality, such as that involved in
seeing a red object, one is ipso facto experientially related to a correlative secondary property such as
redness. But if one thinks of a case like left/right inversion, it is clear that sometimes one can
motivate the idea that experience has some qualitative aspect, without it being in any way natural to
think of tokenings of that quality as involving the subject being experientially related to some
secondary property.
27 See Van Cleve (1991) for discussion of this point, which was originally made by the math-
ematician Moebius—see Moebius (1991).
28 Perhaps if absolutism is true then a change in orientation might be causally sufficient for a
change in experience, but that is obviously not to the point. The present claim would have to be that
there would be a change in experience, even if all the other physical facts were held constant (even if
that is nomologically impossible).
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I would suggest that if we think that reflection is a significantly different kind
of operation from these other spatial operations like rotation, that is because it
appears to us that the difference we experience between incongruent objects is of
a different kind from that we experience between, say, mutually rotated qualit-
atively identical objects. But when we just look formally at these operations, the
intuition this appearance suggests is not supported—and it should be clear by
now that we do not need to bring in some magic difference in the operations to
explain these experiential facts. It could be that the right way to think about it is
that seeing a difference between incongruent objects is a bit like seeing exactly
similar congruent objects, but from different sides, i.e., in situations where our
relations to the objects differ, not the objects themselves.
Another very different objection to the Absolutist view is that it is inconsistent
with certain ways of being a functionalist about experience. Absolute spatial facts
are facts that on many views could differ across worlds without any relevant
difference in the causal profiles of those worlds.29 So, for example, you might
think that if absolutism (small ‘a’) is true, then there is a world just like our world
except that it is arranged in a mirror image. The Absolutist is committed to the
view that the experiences being had by your counterpart in that world are quite
different from your experiences, even though all the functional facts in these two
worlds are the same.30
Another way of bringing out this point is to consider a thought experiment by
Ned Block, as updated by Arnold Zuboff.31 It seems that in principle we could
remove each of your brain cells one by one and fit each removed cell and the
adjacent cells with minute radio transmitters that were capable of ensuring that
the cells continued to fire exactly as and when they would if still embedded in
the ordinary way. It is very hard to see how this could make any difference to the
experiences had by the subject.32 This suggests that we could in principle put
the cells of your brain in any spatial arrangement that we fancied without this
affecting how your experiences ensued, the relevant functional organization
being preserved by the operation.
If this is right, then the spatial arrangement of the brain seems irrelevant to the
determination of experience after all. For example, if we were to take Lefty and
doctored Righty, and explode their brains a` la Block/Zuboff, we would end up
with the same system of transmitters connected to the body in the same way. So,
if the intuition generated by the Block/Zuboff experiment is correct, then the
29 That would not be allowed for on a ‘causal essentialist’ view like Shoemaker’s (1980),
however.
30 Actually not all functionalists need say this—if we consider ‘local’ functional characterizations
of you and your counterpart, with input and output clauses that are allowed to mention absolute
spatial properties, then we could get different characterizations for you both. We only get in trouble
if we ‘Ramsify’ out over the input and output clauses also.
31 See Block (1980) and Zuboff (1981).
32 Admittedly, Block’s original thought experiment was designed to provoke the opposite
intuition.
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absolute spatial difference between Lefty’s and doctored Righty’s brains, whilst
undergoing counterpart experiences, could not make any difference to those
experiences. So Absolutism is false.
You could try making a similar point about the supposed requirement of
asymmetry that was established from the premises of the Relationist Argument.
You might think you could apply the Block/Zuboff technique to any normal
subject to render him temporarily symmetrical, and his subsequent experiences
would still differentiate between incongruent stimuli. (I am unsure about whether
this objection to a relationist position could be made to work, but it’s interesting to
contemplate.33)
The Absolutist might respond as follows. Suppose we take a complete descrip-
tion of our universe, and then ‘Ramsify’ over it, replacing all the property and
relation names with variables, except those that refer to the causal relation. Is it
really plausible that if we bleach out everything in this way, including even terms
for spatial properties and relations, we’ll end up with a description that com-
pletely determines which experiences are occurring? We wouldn’t think that if
we ‘Ramsifyed out’, even over the causal relation as well, so that the description
of the universe was completely formal. So what’s so special about the causal
relation?34 For example, we can imagine a computer simulation of the actual
world that satisfies the same Ramsey description, but does not literally contain
the same distribution of spatial properties. And it is at least not obvious that
running such a simulation would produce real experiences. So, viewed from an
abstract standpoint, it is not particularly compelling that spatial properties could
not be relevant to the determination of experience.
Similarly, a Block/Zuboff exploded brain shares a certain Ramsey character-
ization with a normal brain—they are in a certain way functionally the same,
even though they can massively differ in their spatial properties. Unlike in
the case of functionally equivalent universes, the functional equivalence here is
only at a relatively macroscopic level—the brains are not functionally the same at
the level of fundamental particles, for example. And the brain is not a causally
closed system, so the relevant functional description may be in terms of sub-
stantially specified sensory inputs and behavioural outputs; and there are other
related differences like the fact that only a normal brain can be stroked or
stamped on. But these differences can hardly make all the difference. Unless we
33 Suppose, for example, that having an experience of a certain stimulus involves a sequence of
synchronous neuron firings, each synchronous firing involving 10,000 neurons. Suppose that had
the experience been of an incongruent stimulus, there would have been a completely different
sequence of synchronous firings, each synchronous firing instead involving 9,800 neurons. Then
there will be no way to set things up using the Block/Zuboff technique so that the pattern of neural
firings would be the same up to incongruence whichever stimulus is presented. However, in order
for the point to go through, only one possible case is required, so this consideration is far from
decisive. It is unclear, however, how one would establish the existence of such a case. (One sug-
gestion, made to me by Tamar Szabo´ Gendler, would be to try making replacements in a way that
was not one–one.) 34 John Hawthorne (2001) makes this kind of point.
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are externalists who think that the only spatial facts that matter to experience are
those external to the brain, then if we think that it is dubious whether the spatial
properties really are irrelevant in the universe case, we should probably think the
same about this more localized version.
ASYMMETRICAL LAWS OF NATURE
So much for considerations for and against the view that absolute reflective
properties are relevant to experience. One final issue that is opened up by sup-
posing absolutism (small ‘a’) is that natural laws might be sensitive to the left/
right distinction.35 So, for example, it might be a law that all fundamental
particles are shaped like left gloves.36 This would be relevant to our discussion if
it meant that making perfect mirror-image copies of objects is physically
impossible, since both the Relationist Argument and the Absolutist considera-
tions for intra-world inversion relied on the idea that such things are possible
(remember that an absolutist can run the Relationist Argument.) Similarly, it
might mean that making a perfectly symmetrical object like Simon is physically
impossible. Finally, it would also be relevant if it meant that systems that start off
as incongruent counterparts do not necessarily evolve in the same way. For
example, I assumed earlier that if you show symmetrical Simon a certain
stimulus, then the state he would go into would be the incongruent counterpart
of the state that he would have gone into had he been shown an incongruent
counterpart stimulus. If the laws are asymmetrical, this counterfactual claim
might not be correct.
These impossibilities are worrying because we might be forced to locate these
thought experiments in worlds with different natural laws to ours, worlds where
perhaps we should not even be confident that left/right experiences are possible
at all. One response would be to claim that only relatively macroscopic
mirroring is required for the thought experiments to run, because experiential
facts depend only on properties at some relatively coarse level of grain, such as
35 It is very plausible that there could only be such laws if absolutism was true. Otherwise the
only way the asymmetry could be created by a law of nature would be if a canonical formulation of
the law made explicit reference to a sample asymmetrical object, and then fixed the asymmetry
universally using the congruence relation. It would surely be very surprising if a law looked like that,
since we do not think that fundamental laws mention particular objects.
36 It turns out that the empirical evidence suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that the universe is
indeed ruled asymmetrically in this way. So there is empirical evidence that absolutism is true.
Changing the reflective parity of an atom would change the charge of the particles that constitute it,
transubstantiating it from matter into anti-matter. And the laws governing matter and anti-matter
are rather different (although I am told that an invariance does exist if we consider the trio of
variables: charge, reflective parity, and time. So one could still hold a more complex form of
relationism, consistently with these observations). In particular, given laws governing the interac-
tion of matter and anti-matter, if you produced a mirror-image copy of an object it would disappear
in a flash of energy before it had the chance to have any experiences.
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neural properties. These coarser properties could presumably be laid out in a
mirror image even if the fundamental properties couldn’t be.
But the problem with this is that what experience supervenes on is an
empirical matter, and so it’s not clear why we should trust these intuitions, given
that they do not appear to be backed up by any empirical evidence.37 We would
do better to just insist on running our arguments in worlds where the laws of
nature are not of this kind. If an opponent were to press the complaint that we
have no reason to suppose left/right experience is possible in these symmetrically
ruled worlds, we can throw down the following challenge. If these experiences
are not possible in such worlds, then that must be because there is some physical
property required for left/right experience that can only be instantiated in worlds
that are ruled asymmetrically. But at first blush that is just an extreme example of
an ‘initial asymmetry’ requirement.38 So it is hard to see how a position about
left/right experience distinct from those we have already considered could be
generated from bringing these laws into play.
Certainly more discussion is needed of this issue. It’s not obvious in what
sense having such an asymmetrically profiled property would have to make you
spatially asymmetrical, so the position may be slightly different from the one
generated by the Relationist Argument. There may also be an interesting way of
denying Inversion by taking such a line—it could be claimed that the property
required for having experiences with one phenomenal orientation could not be
instantiated in the same universe as the property required for having experiences
with the other orientation, since the instantiation of these properties requires
different causal laws. (Without further argument, such a position strikes me
as rather implausible, but it does represent an epistemically possible way things
might be.)
TRANSCENDENTAL INFERENCES
If I have been successful, the argument so far should have convinced you of the
following: that however we look at it, there are some interesting connections
between the geometrical properties of the world, and the experiential properties
that are instantiated in the world. And these connections seem to have been
established on an a priori basis given only some very slim assumptions about the
nature of experience.
We can summarize these findings as follows: if absolute reflective properties
do not affect the qualitative character of experience, then the experiences being
37 It’s worth noting here that authors such as Penrose have claimed that facts at a deep level could
be relevant to experience, so clearly not everyone shares the intuition that only relatively macro-
scopic features of the world are relevant to experience.
38 Notice that it wouldn’t be a version of Absolutism, because there can be absolute reflective
facts in symmetrically ruled worlds.
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had in perfectly incongruent scenarios are qualitatively the same. It follows from
this that a subject who started life as a mirror image of you, but who received the
same stimuli as you, would subsequently be experientially inverted with respect
to you; and this shows that experiential asymmetry requires a prior physical
asymmetry in the subject. On the other hand, if conversely Absolutism is true,
then the experiences being had in perfectly incongruent scenarios are reflectively
opposite, and so the qualitative character of experience depends in a certain way
on the absolute spatial facts. Furthermore, the truth of the Inversion Hypothesis
is entailed by Absolutism, provided narrow supervenience obtains. If it does not
obtain, it is left open by Absolutism whether the Inversion Hypothesis is true. In
sum, whichever way we look, there seem to be tight connections between the
spatial properties of the subject (or on an externalist view, the subject and/or his
environment) and the associated experiential properties.
It’s certainly surprising that we could have discovered all this a priori from a
few extremely uncontroversial assumptions about experience. Could I really
work out, just sitting here, that my brain is asymmetrical? Perhaps if you take an
externalist line such as the following—that the spatial character of the experience
is inherited from the spatial properties of the things experienced—then you
shouldn’t find it surprising how easily a connection between space and experi-
ence is established. (This might be evidence in favour of the externalist view.)
But even the externalist is faced with the possibility that we have an armchair
argument to the conclusion that either Absolutism is true, or the surprising
consequences of the Relationist Argument follow. And that disjunctive con-
clusion alone is surprising as a candidate for armchair accessibility.
To decide whether we really have acquired such knowledge from our arm-
chairs, and if so what kind of knowledge it is (is it empirically defeatable, for
example?), would require a long discussion about epistemology which is beyond
the scope of this chapter. But, at first blush, the argument seems to proceed from
known premises using moves that are warrant transferring. So the burden of
proof appears to be on the person who thinks that the argument is not know-
ledge conferring.
CLIMAX AND CONCLUSION
I have now looked at the competing ways of drawing out the connections
between the spatial properties of brains and the left/right character of experi-
ences, and suggested some considerations for and against different ways of
thinking about the problem.
Now for the climax of the paper. One of the following pictures of left–right
experience must be correct, even though each is in its own way quite bizarre. We
have, in short, what Aristotle called an ‘aporia’—a choice of views, none of which
seem true, accompanied by knowledge that one of them is. So, by way of
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a summary, here are the main contenders ((III), (IV) and (V) simply result from
denying assumptions made in the paper until this point):
The Five Options
(I) To say that if there are non-relational reflective properties, then they
are irrelevant in determining experiences, and hence to accept that a
physically symmetrical individual like Simon would be experientially
symmetrical.
(II) To be an absolutist about the reflective orientation of the world, and
claim that this orientation would be sufficient to determine a difference
in the subject’s experiences in our various cases.
(III) To deny that there is ever any qualitative difference between a veridical
experience of an environment and its mirror image by the same subject.
(IV) To deny the supervenience of experiential properties on physical
properties.
The fifth option is to endorse what Shoemaker calls the ‘Frege-Schlick’
hypothesis.
(V) To deny that there are any inter-personal, inter-world, or inter-temporal
facts about the sameness and difference of the qualitative character of
experiences.
Of the five, options (III) and (IV) are the least plausible. Option (III) requires
the barefaced denial of an apparently incontestable feature of experience. And—
unless it is tantamount to commitment to a free-floating realm of experience
largely independent of the physical world—it is unclear that (IV) really helps,
for, even if the physical to mental dependencies are merely nomological, it
appears we could run the same arguments considering the causal basis for
experience instead of the supervenience base.
What about (V), the Frege-Schlick view? The view is motivated by the
thought that what makes particular experiences the same or different is simply
how a subject would classify them if confronted with them; this immediately
rules out inter-subjective comparisons of experiences.39 But, to me, simple
examples from everyday life seem sufficient to establish that such comparisons
are possible, so the view seems like a last resort. Others disagree, however,40 so
perhaps the view warrants further investigation.
This leaves us with (I) and (II). I argued that (I) entails that inter-subjective
reflective inversion is possible, although we were left with some doubts about
that.41 Option (II) less controversially entails this, provided we assume that the
qualitative character of experience supervenes on the intrinsic set-up of the
39 Although see Shoemaker (1982) for an attempt to hold on to this thought without accepting
the Frege-Schlick view. 40 For a recent dissenter, see Stalnaker (1998).
41 See in particular n. 22, and the surrounding discussion.
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observer’s brain. (If we reject that assumption, we get the ‘externalist Absolutist’
view that I have mentioned, which is compatible with denying the possibility of
inversion.)
I think that these views are the only serious contenders. Each brings surprising
consequences about the physical basis of experience, yet one of them must be
true. Which way should we go?
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